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ABSTRACT: Although the fallacy of composition is little studied and trivially illustrated, some view it 
as ubiquitous and paramount. Furthermore, although definitions regard the concept as 
unproblematic, it contains three distinct elements, often confused. And although some scholars 
apparently claim that fallacies are figments of a critic’s imagination, they are really proposing to 
study fallacies in the context of meta-argumentation. Guided by these ideas, I discuss the important 
historical example of Michels’s iron law of oligarchy. 
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1. THE PROBLEM: SIGNIFICANCE VS. TRIVIALITY 
 
Vices may be regarded as the opposite of virtues; and fallacies are, arguably, vices of 
argumentation (cf. Finocchiaro, 1980, p. 338; 1981, p. 17; 2005, p. 116). Thus, one 
may study the virtues of argumentation indirectly by studying fallacies. In any case, 
of course, the study of fallacies is a well-established area of logic and argumentation 
theory (cf. Hamblin, 1970; Woods, 2013), and so no elaborate justification and 
motivation are needed. 
Now, among the fallacies, there is one—the fallacy of composition—whose 
importance has been widely claimed. For example, in 1826, in the Elements of Logic, 
Richard Whately explicitly named and discussed this fallacy, saying among other 
things: “there is no fallacy more common, or more likely to deceive, than the one 
now before us” (Whately, 1826, pp. 174-75). Moreover, at least since the epoch-
making contributions of John Maynard Keynes (who died in 1946), economists tend 
to regard the fallacy of composition as the single worst pitfall in economic 
reasoning; they also consider the exposure of it to be the greatest accomplishment 
of the modern science of economics; they deem the avoidance of it the most 
important lesson one can learn from this science; and such claims are easily found in 
the writings of economists of both the left and right wings of the ideological 
spectrum (cf. Hazlitt, 1979; Nelson, 1999; Samuelson, 1955; Samuelson & Nordhaus, 
1989; Wray, 2009; and Finocchiaro, 2013a). Additionally, in 1981, an article was 
published in the journal Informal Logic, dealing with “part/whole fallacies,” of which 
composition may be regarded as a special case; the author argued that there is “a 
virtual epidemic of part/whole fallacies perpetrated on an unsuspecting public” 
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(Pole, 1981. p. 11). Finally, in 2006, Trudy Govier saw it fit to devote to the fallacy of 
composition her keynote address to the International Society for the Study of 
Argumentation; in it she followed her usual realistic and judicious approach, and 
thus examined some important recent examples of this fallacy, involving issues such 
as individual vs. national reconciliation in South Africa, and individual vs. collective 
actions and blame in the post-nine-eleven relations between Islam and the West 
(Govier, 2007, 2009; cf. Finocchiaro, 2013a). 
However, despite such attention and such claims, scholars in logic and 
argumentation theory do not seem to have done much work on the fallacy of 
composition, although textbooks tend to pay lip service to it. For example, the 
journal Informal Logic has not published any more articles on this fallacy in the 
intervening thirty-one years (i.e., through 2012). Furthermore, there is no sustained 
discussion of it in the volume on Fallacies and Argument Appraisal of the Cambridge 
University Press series on critical reasoning and argumentation; instead, the author 
only mentions it briefly in some introductory remarks on problems with language 
(Tindale, 2007, pp. 57-58). And in his latest book on Errors of Reasoning, even the 
inimitable John Woods (2013) does not get around to elaborating a critique of this 
particular fallacy, as he does for at least fourteen others of the so-called gang of 
eighteen traditional fallacies; however, here it must be added that this book is full of 
insights and should serve as a model to emulate, both with regard to the substantive 
theory of fallacies and to the methodological approach of naturalism which it 
develops (cf. Finocchiaro, 2013a, 2013b); moreover, he does give it due coverage in 
his history of fallacies (Woods, 2012). 
Sometimes this scholarly neglect of the fallacy of composition is explained 
and partly justified in terms of its rarity or infrequency. For example, in the 1973 
edition of his textbook Logic and Philosophy, Howard Kahane has a brief discussion 
of this fallacy together with its reverse twin, the fallacy of division. Here are his 
revealing words: “since non-trivial real life examples of these two fallacies … are 
unusual, textbook examples tend to be contrived or trivial” (Kahane, 1973, p. 244). 
Obviously, this explanation of the scholarly neglect conflicts with the 
ubiquity thesis reported earlier. Thus, the question arises whether the fallacy of 
composition is common and important, or uncommon and unimportant; although 
such a question arises for fallacies in general (cf. Finocchiaro 1981, 1987; Woods 
2013), in this case the problem is more serious because the conflict seems deeper. 
The issue is largely an empirical question, to be resolved by following an empirical 
approach. However, the investigation cannot be conducted with a tabula rasa, for 
we need to be clear about what we mean by fallacy of composition, and also we need 
to examine real or realistic material which typically does not come with the label 
‘fallacy of composition’ attached to it. In other words, we need to be mindful of the 
fact that observation is theory-laden, and that the examination of this material must 
be guided by some definition of what this fallacy is, and by some idea of what to do 
with the material under examination so as to test it for the occurrence of this fallacy. 
 
2. GUIDING IDEAS: AMBIGUITIES AND META-ARGUMENTS 
 
The ubiquity thesis, stated above, besides generating the problem just formulated, 
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may also be regarded as a guiding idea for its solution, at least in the sense that it 
defines our task as being that of determining whether it is true. 
Besides the ubiquity thesis, another guiding idea is this: there are three 
senses of fallacy of composition that are prima facie distinct, but often confused with 
each other. First, there is reasoning from premises using a term distributively to a 
conclusion using the same term collectively; for example, “because a bus uses more 
gasoline than an automobile, therefore all buses use more gasoline than all 
automobiles” (Copi, 1968, p. 81). Second, there is reasoning from some property of 
the parts to the same property for the whole; for instance, “since every part of a 
certain machine is light in weight, the machine ‘as a whole’ is light in weight” (Copi, 
1968, p. 80). And thirdly, there is reasoning from some property of the members of a 
group to the same property for the entire group; the so-called tragedy of the 
commons can illustrate this notion, that is, “if one farmer grazes his cattle on the 
commons, that will be beneficial for him; therefore if all the farmers graze their 
cattle on the commons, that will be beneficial for all” (Govier, 2009, p. 95). 
The association of the second and third notions with each other is very 
common, whereas the association of all three is relatively rare. Nevertheless the 
three-fold association is embodied in a dictionary definition from an otherwise 
authoritative source, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary: “fallacy of 
composition: the fallacy of arguing from premises in which a term is used 
distributively to a conclusion in which it is used collectively or of assuming that 
what is true of each member of a class or part of a whole will be true of all together” 
(1976 edition, p. 818). 
Besides this tripartite distinction and the ubiquity thesis, there is a third 
guiding idea that needs to be at least mentioned and tentatively stated before we 
proceed. In a previous work, I criticized textbook accounts of fallacies, and on its 
basis I formulated a problem and advanced an hypothesis. The problem was 
formulated in terms of the following questions: “do people actually commit fallacies 
as usually understood? That is, do fallacies exist in practice? Or do they exist only in 
the mind of the interpreter who is claiming that a fallacy is being committed?” 
(Finocchiaro, 1980, p. 334; 1981, p. 15; 2005, p. 113). Although these were not 
meant to be rhetorical questions, but rather open questions that required further 
investigation, it is perhaps unsurprising that some readers did view them as 
rhetorical questions, and concluded that I was claiming that fallacies are merely 
figments of critics’ imagination and “are in fact an illusion” (Jason, 1986, p. 92; cf. 
Govier, 1982). 
Later, I tried to be more explicit and more constructive about this issue when 
I elaborated a general approach to the study of fallacies. One element of that 
approach was connected to, and extracted from, Strawson’s (1952) Introduction to 
Logical Theory and his notion of “the logician’s second-order vocabulary”; that 
notion was extended to include ‘fallacy’ terminology, “since it ordinarily occurs 
when someone wants to comment about some logical feature of a first-order 
expression of reasoning. This means that the best place to begin with in the study of 
fallacies, or at least a crucial phenomenon to examine, is allegations that fallacies are 
being committed” (Finocchiaro, 1987, p. 264; 2005, p. 130). From this, some 
elaborated the idea that fallacies are more like theoretical entities such as quarks in 
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physics, rather than like concrete objects such as buttercups in everyday life 
(Woods, 1988). This elaboration was a constructive suggestion and critical 
appreciation, and I am far from denying its viability. 
However, I now believe that the project can be articulated more clearly, 
incisively, and constructively in light of the notion of meta-argumentation (cf. 
Finocchiaro, 2013b). Let us distinguish a meta-argument from a ground-level 
argument, and define the former as an argument about one or more arguments, or 
about argumentation in general. Then a ground-level argument can be defined as 
one about such things as natural phenomena, historical events, human actions, 
abstract entities, or metaphysical beings. A prototypical case of meta-argumentation 
is argument analysis, in which one advances and justifies an interpretive or an 
evaluative claim about a ground-level argument. 
What I am proposing is that we search for fallacies of composition primarily 
in meta-argumentation rather than ground-level argumentation. However, this is 
not meant in the sense that we should be looking for meta-arguments that commit 
the fallacy of composition, but rather that we try to find meta-arguments advancing 
explicit conclusions that some fallacy of composition has been committed, i.e., that 
some ground-level argument embodies or commits a fallacy of composition. The 
working hypothesis is then that, at least as a first approximation, the fallacy of 
composition is primarily a concept of meta-argumentation, useful in the context of 
understanding and/or assessing ground-level argumentation. Whether this is also 
the case for other fallacies is not being addressed here, and is left as an open 
question. 
 
3. MICHELS’S IRON LAW OF OLIGARCHY 
 
Let us now begin our empirical search for real or realistic material pertaining to the 
fallacy of composition. One of the most important discussions of the fallacy of 
composition I have come across is found in the field of political science. It involves 
one of the most famous and widely-discussed principles in that field—the so-called 
“iron law of oligarchy”: that every bureaucratic organization has oligarchical 
tendencies which are impossible to overcome, and that this applies even to 
democratic institutions, which are thus doomed to become undemocratic. This “law” 
was first advanced in a book published in German in 1911, translated into English in 
1915, reprinted many times, and revealingly entitled Political Parties: A Sociological 
Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (Michels, 1962). 
Now, an important criticism of Michels’s law has been advanced by Robert 
Dahl, who is one of the most widely respected political scientists and the founder of 
the field known as democratic theory (Dahl, 1956; 1989). The criticism is that 
Michels began by studying the workings of political parties, in particular the German 
Social Democratic Party; he discovered that even parties advocating democracy had 
insurmountable oligarchical (i.e., anti-democratic) tendencies; he concluded that 
what was true of political parties was also true of governmental institutions or 
societies as a whole; and thus he committed an error of reasoning, consisting of 
illegitimately inferring from parts to the whole (Dahl, 1989, pp. 275-77). 
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Although Dahl does not speak of “fallacy of composition,” it is obvious that he 
is attributing this fallacy to Michels. Furthermore, if Dahl’s criticism is accurate, then 
Michels’s argument provides an example of fallacy of composition which is real, 
important, substantial, and interesting; again, infinitely more robust than the 
hackneyed and trivial examples of logic textbooks. For these reasons, it is valuable 
to quote Dahl’s words: 
 
From the perspective of later political science, then, Michels committed an 
elementary mistake in generalizing from political parties to the government of a 
polyarchal system. His generalizations were derived from the study of a single 
organization, the German Social Democratic Party. His famous “iron law of 
oligarchy” explicitly referred to political parties … But even if we grant that political 
parties are oligarchical, it does not follow that competing political parties necessarily 
produce an oligarchical political system. Business firms are among the most 
“oligarchical” organizations in modern societies; but as I pointed out, Michels’s 
mentor, Pareto, writing as an economist, would never have said that these 
competing oligarchies produced monopolistic control over consumers and the 
market. Not even Marx, who saw business firms as despotic organizations, made 
such an elementary mistake. Quite the contrary: It was competition that prevented 
monopoly. If Michels had strictly limited his conclusions to political parties, his case 
would have been far stronger. But as the quotations given earlier show clearly, 
Michels went on to draw the unwarranted conclusion that democracy is impossible 
in a political system because it was, he believed from his study of one party, 
impossible in a particular element of the system. Had he been writing today it is 
inconceivable that he would have moved so casually from his observation of 
oligarchy in a political party to the conclusion that oligarchy is inescapable in a 
political system in which the political parties are highly competitive. Michels’s 
elementary mistake reminds us that for the most part the theorists of minority 
domination discussed here had little or no experience with systems of competitive 
parties in countries with a broad suffrage or, certainly, with systematic analysis of 
competitive party systems. (Dahl, 1989, p. 276) 
 
Here, Dahl’s talk of generalization may give the impression that he is 
interpreting Michels’s reasoning as an inductive generalization, and criticizing it as a 
hasty one. However, applying the principle of charity at the level of Dahl’s own 
meta-argument, I would say that it is preferable to interpret Dahl as attributing to 
Michels an argument from analogy, and criticizing it as involving a weak analogy. In 
fact, Michels was claiming an analogy between political parties and political systems 
as a whole, based on similarities such as the following: (1) administration by the 
majority is technically impossible; (2) the better elements of the people or mass get 
constantly re-elected; (3) the first leaders have an advantage over newcomers; (4) 
the leaders control party machinery, such as the press; and (5) leaders change 
psychologically in their attitude due to the salary they receive, the power they 
exercise, their interaction with the ruling class, their age, and their attachment to 
their own accomplishments. Without necessarily denying such similarities, Dahl is 
stressing that there is an important dissimilarity, which Michels is ignoring—
competition; in political systems that allow competition among political parties, the 
oligarchic tendencies that exist within parties are counteracted at the macro level of 
the whole political system. 
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On the other hand, whether Michels’s argument is criticized as a hasty 
generalization, or as an incorrect analogy, in either case the criticism would be 
consistent with attributing to it a fallacy of composition. For Michels’s argument 
remains an argument of composition, because it reasons from parts or elements 
being oligarchical to the whole system being oligarchical; and it is being criticized as 
incorrect or fallacious. In other words, adapting an argument by Govier (2007, 2009; 
cf. Finocchiaro, 2013a), I believe that arguments of composition are not a distinct 
kind, but can also instantiate other types, especially inductive generalizations and 
arguments from analogy. 
Another important criticism of Michels’s iron law of oligarchy also relates to 
the fallacy of composition. It is advanced by Seymour Martin Lipset (1962), a 
distinguished political sociologist who wrote the introduction to the English 
translation of Michels’s book. Lipset’s key criticism is that Michels failed to 
appreciate that a whole society can be democratic (i.e., anti-oligarchical) even 
though it is composed of institutional parts that are oligarchical (i.e., anti-
democratic). Again, although Lipset does not use the term, he is attributing a fallacy 
of composition to Michels: that because the particular institutions of a society are 
oligarchic, therefore the whole society must be oligarchical. Lipset can admit that 
Michels’s argument is both compositional and analogical, as sketched above. 
However, Lipset questions Michels’s analogy at another crucial point, thus 
undermining his compositional argument from analogy. For Lipset, there is one 
condition or property present in democratic societies, but absent in undemocratic 
societies and in particular institutions of democratic ones: a constitutional provision 
or traditional-historical practice that bans or prevents any one entity or group from 
exercising tyrannical or despotic power over opposing entities or groups. 
This criticism strikes me as plausible and powerful. In fact, there is a 
tradition of political theory that regards such an anti-tyrannical or anti-despotic 
principle as fundamental (Hamilton, Jay, & Madison, 1961, p. 301; Mosca, 1939, p. 
134; cf. Finocchiaro, 1999, p. 206), although here Lipset does not mention any such 
historical precedents. However, his words in the summary of his criticism leave little 
doubt that he has this principle in mind, as they leave little doubt that he is charging 
Michels with the fallacy of composition: 
 
In essence, democracy in modern society may be viewed as involving the conflict of 
organized groups competing for support … While most private governments, unions, 
professional societies, veterans’ organizations, and political parties will remain one-
party systems … it is important to recognize that many internally oligarchic 
organizations help to sustain political democracy in the larger society and to protect 
the interests of their members from the encroachments of other groups. Democracy 
in large measure rests on the fact that no one group is able to secure a basis of 
power and command over the majority so that it can effectively suppress or deny 
the claims of the groups it opposes. (Lipset, 1962, pp. 36-37) 
 
Dahl’s and Lipset’s critiques are related, insofar as competition and balance 
of power are substantively connected. More importantly for us here, however, their 
critiques are really meta-arguments, which advance the critical conclusion that 
Michels’s argument is erroneous in its reasoning from political parties to the whole 
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political system. These critical meta-arguments could of course be elaborated, 
reconstructed, analyzed, and evaluated at greater length. They strike me as cogent. 
But even if they were not, the relevance to the present investigation would remain, 
in the sense that there would be serious issues at the metalevel, rather than at the 
ground level, about the fallacy of composition: what we mean by fallacy of 
composition, what the ground-level argument is, and how accurate and fair it is to 




With regard to the fallacy of composition, the problem of how frequently it occurs is 
more striking than for the case of the other fallacies, because the contrast is greater 
and starker between the scarcity of scholarly analyses and the triviality of textbook 
examples on the one hand, and the widespread claims made (especially by 
economists) about its prevalence and importance. Thus, the empirical search for 
real or realistic examples is a relatively urgent task. 
Such a search, however empirically minded, must also be guided by some 
assumptions or working hypotheses. One of these is the self-same ubiquity thesis, 
whose truth is being tested. Another guiding idea is that there are three distinct 
senses of “fallacy of composition”; these three notions may turn out to be 
importantly related, but they are prima facie different and should initially not be 
confused. A third key guiding idea is what I have called the meta-argumentation 
hypothesis: that the best places in which to search for fallacies of compositions are 
meta-arguments whose conclusion attributes (explicitly or implicitly) such a fallacy 
to some ground-level argument. 
Guided by these ideas, I discussed the case of the criticism of Michels’s 
argument for the iron law of oligarchy; that is, the argument that political parties 
inevitably become oligarchic even if they claim to have democratic aims; and 
therefore, a democratic society inevitably becomes oligarchic. Dahl objected that 
such reasoning fails because there is a crucial disanalogy between the parts and the 
whole: a democratic society allows significant competition among its parts, but a 
particular party does not. Similarly, Lipset objected that there is another crucial 
difference: a democratic society has an anti-tyrannical system of checks and 
balances in its written or unwritten constitution, but political parties and labor 
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